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Chapter 2 26 We can characterise this process of lifelong development as a sort of ‘dynamic state’. A ‘state’ because flourishing is an attainable state – but it is not a static condition, but characterised by ongoing development, effort to sustain it and striving to improve it. Thus, it is a dynamic state. 2c. Objective goods It is characteristic of conceptions of flourishing to acknowledge that there are things that are good for everybody. Some of these objectively good things are constitutive of a flourishing life, for example social relationships, other objective goods are good capacities, the development of which will contribute to the flourishing of human beings, for example phronesis , practical wisdom, which Aristotle deems necessary to exercise all other virtues. For our purpose (open, formal criteria), it suffices to say that it is a common denominator in most literature on human flourishing that objectively good human capacities are being developed. 52 Happiness, however, does not need this kind of external judgment about whether something is good or not. Popular conceptions of happiness seem to centre on subjective feelings of well-being only. In conceptions of human flourishing, this is not the case. 53 We do not imply, however, that the concept excludes subjective assessments as part of human flourishing. Several authors argue that human beings do not flourish unless they themselves know or feel that they do. 54 These make a plea for a ‘mixed theory’, a conception of human flourishing that acknowledges the importance of both objective and subjective goods. 2.4 F LOURISHING IN K ANT ’ S P HILOSOPHY Five formal criteria for ‘human flourishing’ have been proposed for which Aristotle’s eudaimonia functioned as a prototype. We have said in the introduction that although eudaimonia has been used as an exemplar, it is in itself a conception of human flourishing. In this section, we give an example of a conception of human flourishing that differs a great deal from Aristotle’s, namely that of Immanuel Kant. It has often been argued that Kant had limited or no room for a conception of human flourishing. For example, Hill writes that Kant’s conception of happiness cannot be a conception of human flourishing, because happiness is not an important intrinsic goal of Kant’s moral rules, 52 See for example Hurka 1999; Kraut 2007; Huta 2011; De Ruyter 2012. 53 For example in Aristotle 2009; Anscombe 1958; Hurka 1999; Rasmussen 1999. 54 De Ruyter 2007, p. 27; but also Aristotle 2009; Rasmussen 1999; De Ruyter 2004; White 2006; Haybron 2008; Griffin 1986.