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Chapter 2 27 which is a criterion (1) of flourishing. 55 We argue that this explanation is based on the mistake of taking Kant’s conception of happiness as a conception of flourishing. A conception of flourishing should not be sought in Kant’s ideas on happiness, but in Kant’s notion of the highest good, which is his ‘final end’ and an intrinsically worthwhile good (see criterion 1). For Kant, the highest good conceivable is a combination of moral perfection and (deserved) happiness ( Glückseligkeit ). 56 This optimal combination of striving for moral perfection and feeling happy, which we recognise from Aristotle, could very well be a conception of human flourishing. Kant has an ultimate goal of conduct in mind, which is some kind of optimal state of being. Can we really say that this optimal state of being is flourishing, i.e. the actualisation of human potential? Denis argues, following Engstrom, that the similarities between Aristotelian eudaimonia and Kant’s highest good suggest at least a ‘rough’ conception of flourishing. 57, 58 The following discussion confirms this suggestion. We have already shown that criterion 1 has been fulfilled, since perceiving flourishing as intrinsically worthwhile has been our starting point. Kant puts great emphasis on development in his description of the highest good ‘of a possible world’. 59 He sees the full development of characteristic human capacities as our ‘destiny’ and as necessary for realising a state of optimal being in the whole world. 60 Kant sees some kind of threshold for human beings to reach in order to flourish, yet is at the same time convinced that human beings are always on their way towards that threshold, and that this dynamic is ongoing, from generation to generation (criterion 2b). 61 He questions whether this optimal state of being can ever be reached. He devotes several comments to the practical possibility of the highest good, but he seems to conclude that it is impossible. It can only be found in ‘endless progress’ towards it. 62 The most comprehensive conception of flourishing in Kant’s writings is informed by his account of duties to oneself. 63 This is because many or our duties require us to do things in order to become the best version of ourselves we can be. ‘We are to consider ourselves as moral beings who are human beings, with specifically human drives and capacities; to cultivate our innate capacities; and to bring our emotions into some measure of harmony with reason’. 64 Denis shows 55 Hill 1999. 56 MacIntyre 1981, p. 85; Stange 1920, p. 98; Haybron 2008, p. 36; Denis 2008, p. 85. 57 Denis 2008, p. 86. 58 Engstrom 1996. 59 Denis 2008. 60 See Kraut 2007, p. 140 on human capacities and see Denis 2008, p. 91. 61 Kant 1996. 62 Ibid, p. 102. 63 Denis 2008, p. 97. 64 Idem.