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Chapter 2 28 that Kant had a view on development that focused on the human being qua human being, on actualising the human potential whilst fulfilling our duties (see criterion 2). We have not yet discussed the remaining criteria of (2a) judging the flourishing life as a whole and (2c) the necessity of referring to objective goods. The criterion of objective goods is easily met. In the very first lines of the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant explains the difference between the maxims of someone’s will, which are subjective, and the practical laws, which are their objective counterpart. 65 Moral perfection, as part of Kant’s conception of flourishing, presupposes obedience to these objective practical laws, which makes them a necessary part of his conception of flourishing as well. It is difficult to explicitly clarify Kant’s notion of ‘life as a whole’ on the basis of his writings. It is apparent from Kant’s writings on morality that moral perfection should be sought after in all life-spheres. It is not good enough to just be morally good ‘at home’. However, there is more to life than morality, as Kant too acknowledges. Whether or not one should flourish in the (non- moral) life ‘as a whole’, is not explicitly elucidated by him. We think that a holistic perspective in Kant’s work is most clearly found in his thoughts on the full development of human capacities, assuming that full development means development in all life-spheres. 66 We conclude that Kant’s notion of the highest good meets the five criteria and thus can be called a conception of human flourishing. There are similarities with Aristotelian eudaimonia , but there is also an important difference. Happiness remains conceptually distinct from virtue within the highest good. 67 Kant thought they were ‘extremely heterogeneous concepts’, whereas in eudaimonia they are intertwined. 68 It is very important for Kant’s moral theory that happiness is not part of moral goodness, because, he claims, it should not be the ultimate goal of moral perfection. A person does not strive for moral perfection in order to become happy. 69 Another difference, noted by for instance Denis and Conly, is that in Kant’s ethics there is more attention for the differences in desires, temperaments and situations of different people, which leads to great differences in what their flourishing lives might look like. 70 Although Aristotle also emphasises the individuality of flourishing, his view on ‘the flourishing life’ was more ‘standardised’ than Kant’s. 71 65 Kant 1996, p. 17. 66 Denis 2008, p. 91. 67 Denis 2008, p. 85. 68 Kant 1996, p. 93. 69 Ibid., pp. 99-100. 70 Denis 2008, p. 108; Conly 1988. 71 Denis 2008, p. 98; Conly 1988.