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Chapter 2 29 2.5 I MPLICATIONS FOR E DUCATIONAL T HEORY : C ONCLUSION Two formal criteria of ‘human flourishing’ have been proposed: first, flourishing should be perceived as intrinsically worthwhile (1). Second, human flourishing means ‘the actualisation of human potential’ (2), which entails that to be able to say that someone flourishes, we argue that one has to look at her life as a whole in a holistic sense (2a); that in order to actualise human potential a continuous developmental process is required, which shows that flourishing is perceived as a ‘dynamic state’ (2b); and that there is a necessary reference to objective goods, in the sense that there are human capacities that are objectively good for a person as well as certain external goods people need in order to live well (2c). Aristotelian eudaimonia was used as an exemplar for these criteria, but it was also shown to be just one conception of flourishing. Using Kant’s work as an example, we have shown that the concept is wider, and allows for various conceptions. Now, what does this mean for flourishing as an aim of education? It seems that human flourishing as an overarching aim of education has been proposed out of discontent with the current school system(s). 72 Philosophers of education have actually been asking themselves the same question as Aristotle did: what is really important in life? And if ‘leading a flourishing life’ is the answer, what then is really important to teach our children? Surely not (only) to get a well-paying job and be ‘profitable’ to our society. 73 We should equip children so that they can contribute to society in a meaningful way and get the best chance of leading a flourishing life. We think that listing formal criteria for the concept of human flourishing can contribute to clarifying why flourishing is being defended as an ideal aim of education and not something else. We suspect that ‘flourishing’ is not an arbitrary word-choice, that philosophers of education have reasons to use it, and we believe it should not be chosen casually. We fear that without some limits (on a formal level) the concept of flourishing might devaluate until it is used indiscriminately. The reasons for using this particular concept would then evaporate, and flourishing would become ‘just another’ popular phrase to agitate against the current aims of education. Listing formal criteria, as we have attempted to do in this chapter, can facilitate reflection on conceptions of human flourishing, it might elucidate to which aspects conceptions are similar and where they differ, and third, as said, it can be a tool to discriminate between flourishing and related terms, such as (subjective) well-being and happiness. For example, take criterion 1: ‘flourishing is intrinsically worthwhile’. Sometimes well-being and flourishing are both used in the same context, suggesting that they can be used 72 See for instance Brighouse 2006; Reiss and White 2013. 73 Nussbaum 2010.