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Chapter 3 46 concern in the actual practice of education is however that children in fact do not all have access to the same (levels) of these basic goods. According to this first option we should prioritise theorising how the basic, instrumental needs of children are to be reached. This would avoid a reliance on bad idealisations of the type discussed above. However, the concept of human flourishing is regarded as a final aim – that which everything in life aims at, and theory on education for flourishing is likely to describe what the final, i.e. most complete and thus perfect state of flourishing looks like and consequently of how to educate for flourishing in a most complete way. Thus, a second, though not mutually exclusive, option is to develop a theory on education for human flourishing in which the nonideal is the starting point and as such integrated in the conceptualisation of (how to reach) the final, ideal situation. This will satisfy our need to know how to deal with idealisations when moving to the nonideal level. We can take ‘autonomy’, or the ‘right to self-government’, as an important ideal educational aim and part of a flourishing life to exemplify how this can be done. 73 Theorising about autonomy as (part of) an aim of education in ideal -theoretical form would imply starting with an exploration of what perfect autonomy looks like. An ideal theory on education for flourishing would then theorise how parents and/or schools could best (ideally) educate children in order that they be able to live an autonomous life. As said, utopian idealism would do this irrespective of how ‘real’ children can be educated, whereas realistic idealism theorises the ideal given the possibilities of real children. Alternatively, we can theorise about autonomy by starting with ‘our experiences of the features of the [highest forms of autonomy] we actually enjoy as imperfect moral beings’. 74 That would lead us to start from a position of acknowledgment of an inherent dilemma when theorising about autonomy, because an individual’s autonomy is usually the outcome of a better or worse ‘trade-off’ between different values, negotiated with different people who all want to self-govern their lives. This approach has the advantage of recognizing how it is typical of autonomy – in light of everything one values – to be a compromise, because, for example, parents who love their children may sometimes be most happy if they can make their children happy, also when that means that the parents cannot pursue their own autonomy. The difference between the forms of theorising about autonomy, ideal (utopian or realistic) and nonideal, is twofold. Not only the process of theorising, but also the ideal is different. As described, ideals can move on a spectrum of realisability. 75 Utopian ideal theory describes the perfect 73 Cf. Hall 2016, pp. 91-92. ‘Autonomy’ is argued by White 2011 to be an important educational aim and part of flourishing, and the ‘right to self-government’ by Brighouse 2006. 74 Hall 2016, p. 91. 75 Cf. Flanagan 1991, p. 40; Williams 1985, p. 178.