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Chapter 4 59 and b) that, moreover, it is even necessary for good education (here education includes both formal schooling and informal upbringing) to engage in such risk-taking. In other words; it denies the possibility and merit of a Wagnis . Some philosophers of education criticize this observed discourse of risk. Some of them focus on the bias in the negative connotations of risk in relation to children and families, while others emphasise the positive role that risk should have for good or ‘real’ education. 34 We think that what these examples of critique argue for is the existence of a type of risk that is existential. We agree with their argument, and think that Bollnow’s description of das Wagnis contributes to the power of their argumentation. Families ‘at risk’ Paul Smeyers writes that there is a ‘tendency to speak of children and families as being “at risk”, which in many cases seems to lead to a climate in which the legitimacy of government interventions comes to be broadly accepted’. 35 ‘At risk’ is perceived here as that there is a greater than average likelihood that unwanted events occur, and that these unwanted events are in need of a solution; someone (the government) who can fix them, or – even better – is able to prevent them. According to Smeyers, this need to fix it, and as such make education risk-free, is ‘self-deceptive’, because it indicates, wrongfully, that every educational problem can be solved. 36 If the implication is that all risks of education are, in principle, solvable, as in the flawed analogy of a craftsmanship, meaning that all families ‘at risk’ could be saved if one only did better interventions, and as such denies the necessity of Wagnis , then that is indeed self-deceptive. Smeyers argues that such use of the word risk implies both a certain way of looking at (and describing) child- rearing and a simplification of what parenthood is. 37 It distracts us from the complexity and inherent uncertainty of parenthood. However, Smeyers should be careful that he does not lead us to the conclusion that we cannot speak of families ‘at risk’; there are families at risk for whom it is wise that governments intervene, just as much as there are risks that parents wisely seek to avoid ( before you cross the street, take my hand ). We think that if Smeyers would make a distinction between risks that can and should be avoided, and the type of existential risk that is unavoidable and necessary , in the way that Bollnow does, and that both types of risk are a part of the complexity of parenthood, this might make more clear that Smeyers thinks that it is ‘self-deceptive’ to attempt to make education free of existential risks, but that this doesn’t mean that governments can’t have legitimate reasons to intervene in so-called families ‘at risk’. 34 Illustrative of the former is Smeyers 2010, an example of the latter is Biesta 2013. 35 Smeyers 2010, p. 272. 36 Ibid., p. 281. 37 Ibid., p. 283.