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Chapter 1 7 Luck, dependency, fragility Nussbaum defines luck as that which ‘just happens to [one], as opposed to what [one] does or makes’, comparable to how the Greek word tuchē has been used. 28 From an epistemological perspective, Coffman argues that a plausible account of luck entails roughly that ‘an event that constitutes a stroke of (good or bad) luck for you (a) has some objective evaluative status for you, (b) lies beyond your direct control, and (c) is such that there was a large chance no event like it would occur’. 29 Alaisdair MacIntyre draws our attention to what he calls the virtues of acknowledged dependence , as a necessary counterpart to the virtues of independence. He argues that if we are to understand the virtues [such as justice, temperateness, courage] as enabling us to become independent practical reasoners [and as such be able to flourish], just because they also enable us to participate in relationships of giving and receiving through which our ends as practical reasoners are to be achieved, we need to extend our enquiries a good deal further, by recognizing that any adequate education into the virtues will be one that enables us to give their due to a set of virtues that are the necessary counterpart to the virtues of independence, the virtues of acknowledged dependence. (..) [These virtues] require from us characteristically types of action that are at once just, generous, beneficent, and done from pity. The education of dispositions to perform just this type of act is what is needed to sustain relationships of uncalculated giving and graceful receiving. 30 In care ethics, dependence is seen as central to human life and development. 31 In the introduction to The subject of care; feminist perspectives on dependency Ellen Feder and Eva Feder Kittay state that ‘while theoretical prominence has been given to interactions among equals in the canonical works of political and moral philosophy, relations among unequals in fact dominate our social life’. 32 The teacher-pupil relationship and the parent-child relationship, central to education, are paradigmatic examples of unequal relationships. Elsewhere Feder Kittay argues that dependency should not be regarded as a factor in evaluating whether or not human beings can lead flourishing lives – people who are more dependent on others should not be considered to be less able to flourish. On the 28 Nussbaum 1986, p. 3. 29 Coffman 2007, p. 385. 30 MacIntyre 1999, p. 120-121. 31 Feder Kittay 2005, p. 453. 32 Feder and Feder Kittay 2002, p. 2.