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Chapter 5 75 promote reach a grand climax where one has successfully done philosophy. One cannot see this (at least I cannot) either subjectively as the perfecting of one’s effort, nor objectively as what a final philosophy would be like. 40 As with ‘trying to do philosophy’, a standard of flourishing cannot be precisely specified (how many relationships, how healthy should one be); nor does one reach a point at which one says: now I live a complete, flourishing life! As Aristotle said, one can only say about a life whether it is a flourishing life or not, when it is observed as a completed whole (which is only possible at the end of someone’s life). 41 There is no specific point in time at which the aim of flourishing (‘the grand climax’) has been reached. And flourishing is also, like philosophy, something one can ‘get better at’, which can succeed more and less adequately with regard to people’s particular circumstances and capabilities. 42 The concept of flourishing therefore, due to its significant features such as being an ultimate, multi- interpretable aim, which is never really finished, is the type of concept that is best conceptualised as a (regulative) ideal. When perceived as an ideal, there is no expectation of complete fulfilment, and there is, in principle, no precise prescription available for how one should reach a flourishing life. Kristjánsson describes human flourishing as a ‘satis concept’, by which he means that for someone to be flourishing, she has to be flourishing ‘enough’ (enough flourishing will ‘satisfy’ the concept). 43 This seems also to be in line with how we commonly speak of flourishing; we do say that someone is flourishing even though we at the same time realise that this person is not ‘done’ with flourishing (i.e. can ‘tick the box’ of living a flourishing life). Yet, it is different from the idea of a regulative ideal as defined by Emmet. For instance as a ‘satis concept’ ‘trying to do philosophy’ might be successful ‘enough’ when one for example has been able to write a dissertation, or has been able to publish an article, or something of the like. But, even though Kristjánsson argues that a question about flourishing is usually a question about minimal requirements, what these requirements ought to be is a difficult question. 44 Human flourishing is such a complex concept, built up out of many ‘satis’ concepts (e.g. happiness, success, autonomy), which in turn have both objective and subjective elements, that it is not possible to determine in advance how much one needs of which aspect, what the subjective ‘effect’ will be of actualizing particular aspects, and how these will (subjectively) affect other aspects. 40 Idem. 41 Aristotle 2009, p. 18, 1101a10-20. 42 See De Ruyter 2015. Flourishing, naturally, is also a different ‘activity’ in important respects. Whereas doing philosophy is an activity, flourishing is better seen as a dynamic state (see chapter 2), which also depends on what happens to a person, as opposed to what this person does or makes. 43 Kristjánsson 2017, p. 97. A ‘satis’ concept is similar to a ‘threshold’ concept, e.g. Curzer 2012, p. 400-401. 44 Kristjánsson 2017, p. 97.