110 Chapter 4 Importantly, the distinction between approach 1 – futures framed by likelihood/ probability and approach 2 – futures framed by plausibility and deep uncertainty was the focus of in-depth conceptual debates, and in some instances, a source of confusion. A large group of participants positioned themselves within the probabilistic futures domain, yet there were different understandings of what probable futures can entail and how one can go about assessing such futures. For example, a few participants critiqued the usage of probabilities in futures studies, stating that probability is merely a statistical application assigned to the data assumptions underpinning any single scenario, not of the scenarios as a whole. These participants emphasized that probabilistic scenario analysis cannot identify a most probable future but only probable occurrences under certain conditions and scenario assumptions. This means that probability assessments can be made for a set of scenarios that are not ranked, but instead all considered plausible. On the other hand, a number of participants commented on incorporating fundamental uncertainty (approach 2) in their analyses, while still sticking to approach 1 framings of prediction and probability. All in all, probabilistic futures work seems on the one hand a well-established category of futures work, yet on the other hand part of ongoing debate, especially in terms of its boundaries with approach 2. Plausible futures (approach 2) were referred to as ‘what-if ’ scenarios to illustrate their exploratory character. The Sentinel project used uncertainty matrices to develop four plausible scenarios with stakeholders (Zurek and Hebinck, 2018). Stakeholders identified drivers and driver complexity across multiple systems (socioecological, sociotechnical, economic, political, geopolitical etc.), as well as commonalities between them. These matrices served as the backbone for scenario development. What-if scenarios were also used to arrive at a most desired future. In Agrimonde-Terra, a desirable future scenario was introduced for land-use and food security in 2050 and contrasted with the drawbacks of the other four plausible scenarios (Mora et al., 2020). Also, several modelling exercises took plausibility as a starting point, by identifying key drivers underpinning the simulation of scenarios in a participatory process focused on multiple plausible scenarios (e.g. Impressions). Participants explained that global modeling exercises rarely result in normative scenarios, but often in explorative scenarios (of global change patterns), whereas national and sub-national modeling exercises allow for identifying preferred future trajectories. To summarize, most, of the work within the Foresight4Food initiative is plausibility focused, but this plausibility orientation is used to shape how the future is engaged with, often with a strong focus on identifying desirable futures. Participants who positioned their work as focused on pluralistic, normative scenarios (approach 3) were fewer, yet these participants provided thought-provoking viewpoints.
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