149 Opening up or closing down anticipatory governance 5 underlying future visions on their political implications (approaches 3 and 4) and these are mainly concentrated in the Central American context. The analysis shows that anticipation approaches in practice are typically hybrids of the four ideal types of anticipatory governance approaches – with approaches decreasing in dominance from 1 to 4. Approach 1 processes seem to provide policy recommendations that fit incumbent policy frames and are therefore typically favored in the translation of outcomes to policy. Approach 2 receives growing recognition for its engagement with the deep uncertainty of climate futures; but its implications are harder to connect to linear planning. Approach 3 elements are incorporated in the designs of governance actors who recognize the need for more radically transformative change. Approach 4 is considered the least, but its principles inform some designs, particularly of those who are concerned equitable and just climate futures. Nevertheless, our research shows that the translation from anticipation to governance action, regardless of the methodological underpinnings of the anticipation process, often means inferring linear planning actions – which builds on the belief that futures can be objectified, quantified and managed (Maechler & Graz, 2020). Approach 1 seems to dominate because practitioners feel it adheres most to policy discourses on effective anticipatory actions that favor technocratic and consensus-based advice and expertanalytic solutions for risk mitigation (e.g., seed modifications and water management). This was particularly mentioned in the West African and South Asian contexts. In order to meet such technocratic standards of effectiveness, incumbent actors justify decisions based on technical recommendations – or use subjective outcomes under the guise of technical decision-making (Jasanoff, 1987). This results in a process of reframing, and less transparent reporting of subjective processes. This also explains why there is some space to consider more uncertainty through plausibility-based futures, on the technical arguments of systems thinking and resilience. However, discordant ideas on the future are typically not translated. Even those processes that aimed to open up to pluralistic worldviews, neglected issues and alternative futures (mostly in Central American contexts and some in Southeast Asian and South Asian contexts) are therefore closed down to some degree in practice, even if greater participation and novel methods can still be said to lead to more inclusive policy making than if these processes would not have happened. In sum, the process of more open participation is seen to have added value, but the outcomes are valued less, or at least recognized less in official documentation.
RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy MTk4NDMw