58 Chapter 1 an ideology or a discourse (such as the discourse of modernity). In fact, the Western philosophical tradition has become, according to Levinas (1969), a closed system. A person can have the inclination to enclose him- or herself in a totality, meaning that he or she lives in an individual, closed system. However, there is, in every human being, a deep need and subsequent longing for the metaphysical. This is what Levinas referred to with Infini. Our very existence is laid out on the infinite, and we meet that when otherness presents itself while it breaks through our totalities or closed systems. Levinas (1969) called this an epiphany and then spoke of the Other (with a capital ‘O’). This happens in a very concrete sense. We see otherness in the face of the other that presents itself—with its otherness—to us. This interrupts our existence and appeals to us. It asks for space and for a responsible reaction. We enclose ourselves in our houses, isolated from others, but the Other knocks on our doors and appeals intensely to our deepest form of responsibility. The answer, argued Levinas (1969), should be ethical, morally good, aimed at ending war and finding peace—or peaceful existence with the Other in the world. More succinctly, this appeal is depicted in the countenance of the Other. Levinas’ philosophy is, therefore, a philosophy of the face. Teaching plays an important role in Levinas’ philosophy. It is meant as broadly as the definition of citizenship education provided in the introduction to this dissertation: ‘The art of creating social cohesion’. Teaching entails a conversation in which the master confronts the student with otherness and presents him or her with infinity. It is an ongoing process in which teaching seeks to support the being and presence of the student, especially in relation to others. Levinas (1969) went as far as to state that only absolute otherness can teach us. In this context, he presented a plea for (inter)subjectivity, even describing his work as a defence of subjectivity. It is exactly this notion that has helped educational philosophers to mine Levinas’ (1969) philosophy of the face for education. When Biesta (2015) presented his theory of three partly overlapping educational domains, he was inspired by Levinas. Education may or may not blend fully into qualification (enhancing knowledge and skills) or socialisation (correct insertion in society), but it has to focus deliberately and intensely on subjectification. Subjectification, according to Biesta’s (2022) vocabulary, is concerned with both freedom and responsibility, with being a self who responds freely to what appeals: Responsibility—and here I follow Emmanuel Levinas—is not something we choose, but is actually something we encounter. And it is in such encounters, when responsibility comes to me, so to speak, that my subjectness, my
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