Deposit? Yes, please! The effect of different modes of assigning reward-and deposit-based financial incentives on effort 287 9 Demand for commitment was measured by presenting respondents with a multiple-choice question. The following question was used: ‘Imagine you have made plans to invest some amount of effort on a task you would normally not enjoy much, but has benefits in the future, for example: exercising, doing taxes, going to the doctor/dentist. To make sure you actually stick to your plan next week, you are offered to pay a small deposit. That is, you can pay €5 that you will receive back in full if you indeed stick to your plan (i.e., go exercise, do the taxes, visit the doctor), but is lost if you forget or postpone. Would you pay this deposit?’. Respondents could answer: 1) Yes, absolutely, 2) Yes, probably, 3) I’m not sure, 4) No, probably not, and 5) No, absolutely not. The first two answers are interpreted as having demand for commitment. Loss aversion was, in line with Lipman,5 measured with the non-parametric method6. The method involves eliciting three chained indifferences between monetary gambles, enabling estimation of a loss aversion coefficient λ as defined by Köbberling and Wakker7. Loss aversion is defined with > 1 (λ = 1, λ < 1) indicating loss aversion (loss neutrality, gain seeking). More details on the implementation of the non-parametric method can be found in Appendix A (Online Supplements). Tedious task and incentives for effort After completing these measures, respondents were reminded that they had to complete a second online session (i.e., at T1), in which they would complete a set of tedious tasks. The tedious task was modelled after the slider task developed by Gill and Prowse8. In this task, respondents are asked to move adjustable slider bars to a specific point. Respondents were explained they could complete as little or many sliders as they wanted (between 0 and 400), and they would earn a reward for each task completed. After this explanation, respondents completed a practice task (i.e., one page with 20 sliders), such that they could judge the type of effort provision required of them. Finally, respondents were informed that they had earned a €4 show-up fee and received information about the incentives provided for their effort on the slider task in T1. The show-up fee would be paid when they completed the second session (T1), for which automated invitations were sent out exactly 1 week later. With the slider tasks they would earn a reward, that would be paid out at T2, i.e., one week after completing the slider task. Effort-contingent payments were delayed to T2 to be able to draw parallels between the slider tasks and health behaviour change (e.g., exercise), as in these cases immediate effort is often traded off against a reward in the future.
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