Chapter 9 292 Baseline and repeated measures Table 3 shows the economic preferences elicited at T0 for the full sample, the sample that showed up for session T1 and the repeated measure elicitation. Dropout is not related to economic preferences: we find no evidence for differences in demand for commitment (Chi squared test, p=0.99), loss aversion or delay discounting (t-tests, all p’s > 0.16) between the full sample or the sample after dropout. Our data showed considerable hypothetical demand for commitment, as seen in Table 3. That is, 65% of the sample would demand commitment at T0 (66% among those that showed up for T1). In the repeated measure completed at T1 this was somewhat lower, with 56% demanding commitment. Chi-squared tests were suggestive of slightly lower demand for commitment in T1 and the repeated measure but the test missed significance (p = .063). Demand for commitment at T0 and T1 were significantly and strongly correlated (Pearson’s r=0.73, p<0.001). In session T0 we found considerable loss aversion. That is, 212 out of 228 respondents were loss averse (93%), and the same was true for 160 out of the 171 respondents returning for session T1. The proportion of loss averse respondents was similar for the repeated measurement in session 2 (92%). Comparing TO and T1 (3.69 vs 6.05, respectively), no statistically significant difference was found (t(169)=1.49, p=0.112). The loss aversion parameters estimated at T0 and T1 were significantly but only small to moderately correlated (Pearson’s r=0.21, p=0.004) Table 3, furthermore, shows that across all sessions a slight majority of respondents preferred the larger delayed rewards in most items. The k-parameter indicates the degree of sensitivity to delay, where the small numbers in Table 3 indicate that respondents were generally not strongly discounting delays. Furthermore, the test-retest reliability of the MCQ appears reasonable, as differences between measurements appeared small. The k-parameters elicited at T0 and T1 were significantly and strongly correlated (k-parameter: Pearson’s r=0.65, p<0.001). Finally, we checked if (in)stability of economic preferences would affect the recommended incentive scheme. For 89.5% of our respondents, the recommended incentive scheme would have been the same in both sessions.
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