Deposit? Yes, please! The effect of different modes of assigning reward-and deposit-based financial incentives on effort 295 9 Table 3. Baseline and repeated measures used for nudged assignment Session T0 (n=228) T0 measurement for those attending Session T1 (n=171 remaining) Session T1: Repeated measurement Would you commit? Yes, absolutely (n, %) 42 (18%) 32 (18%) 28 (16%) Yes, probably (n, %) 105 (46%) 81 (47%) 67 (29%) Not sure (n, %) 28 (12%) 21 (12%) 32 (18%) No, probably not (n, %) 38 (17%) 26 (15%) 35 (20%) No, absolutely not (n, %) 15 (7%) 11 (6%) 8 (4%) Loss aversion Median (Q1-Q3) 2.68 (1.64 - 4.81) 2.63 (1.64 - 4.74) 2.38 (1.64 - 4.29) Mean (SD) 5.55 (15.95) 6.06 (18.29) 3.69 (4.06) Discounting: Proportion of LL* Median (Q1-Q3) 0.56 (0.41 - 0.67) 0.52 (0.41 - 0.67) 0.52 (0.41 - 0.67) Mean (SD) 0.56 (0.21) 0.56 (0.21) 0.55 (0.20) Discounting: K-parameter Median ( Q1-Q3) 0.01 (0 - 0.02) 0.01 (0 - 0.02) 0.01 (0 - 0.02) Mean (SD) 0.02 (0.03) 0.02 (0.03) 0.01 (0.03) *LL = larger delayed reward Contrast 1: The effect of (nudged) choice With 115 respondents in the random assignment arm and 113 in the nudged assignment arm distribution was spread evenly at T0 (as expected given treatment arms were randomly assigned). Drop-out in the nudged arm (32 out of 113, 23%) compared to the random arm (25 out of 115, 22%, see also Figure 1) was not statistically significant different (Chi-square test, p = .320). Visual inspection of respondent persistence (see Figure 4) suggests that a difference in starting point and a difference in slope exists between the arms. The starting point reflects the percentage of respondents that started slider tasks, and very few respondents completed the experiment without allocating any effort. A
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