Chapter 9 296 similar pattern can be observed for the total earnings between the random and nudged arm, where the earnings in the nudged arm are higher, but the statistical test missed significance (t-test, p = .081). Table 4 model 1 shows the regression equivalent of contrast 1 taking payment condition into account. Having a choice (i.e., the nudged assignment arm) was positively associated with both persistence (β = 48.4, p = .044) and earnings (β = 189.6, p = .011). Hence, conditional on payment condition, nudged assignment with an opt-out significantly increased both effort and earnings compared to randomly assigned incentives. Contrast 2: The effect of deposit-based incentives (for random assignment) Within the random assignment arm respondents were evenly distributed among reward- and deposit-based incentives schemes. Drop-out was not statistically different (Chi-squared test, p=0.250) between those randomly assigned depositbased incentives (15 out of 55, 27%) and those assigned to reward-based incentives (10 out of 60, 17%) Figure 4 panel 2 shows that persistence and earnings were similar between the two incentive schemes. In Table 4, Model 2 regression results showed no significant differences between reward and depositbased incentive schemes corrected for payment condition for both persistence and earnings. Those randomised to the deposit-based scheme seemed to earn less, but this effect missed statistical significance (β =-214.0, p = .068). This is intuitive: if persistence is not higher among those who take up for a depositbased incentives, then total earnings will be lower in this group since they have given up their show-up fee. Contrast 3: The effect of deposit-based incentives (for nudged arm) Contrast 3a: Who chooses deposit-based incentives? Most respondents in the nudged assignment arm were advised to take up depositbased incentives (i.e., 100 out of 113 respondents). This result is explained by the high hypothetical demand for commitment as well as considerable loss aversion.(3) Interestingly, when respondents were recommended to take rewardbased incentives, 100% of the respondents adhered to this advice. In contrast, 3 One respondent in the nudged assignment condition was incorrectly advised to take-up deposits due to a computing error. This respondent followed up on the ‘incorrect’ deposit advice.
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