Deposit? Yes, please! The effect of different modes of assigning reward-and deposit-based financial incentives on effort 297 9 only 44% adhered to the advice to choose a deposit-based scheme.(4) Next, we explored if the demographics were associated with adherence to the informed advice implemented in the nudged assignment arm, as well as investigating if the baseline measures that determine the advice are related to adherence. In a set of univariate tests (i.e., t-tests or Chi-squared tests) we found no evidence in favour of associations between demographics and adherence to informed advice. As such, respondents’ propensity to take the informed advice was not dependent on their demographics. Similar, respondents’ propensity to take the informed advice was neither dependent on economic preferences, i.e., delay discounting, demand for commitment and loss aversion. This result was robust to excluding those receiving the advice to take reward-based incentives, of whom everyone took the advice, and no one deviated. Further multivariate analyses supported the previous findings. The only evidence in favour of an association between advice adherence and economic preferences was observed when restricting the data to only those who showed up for both sessions, i.e., ignoring drop-out. In this model demand for commitment was associated with advice adherence (β = -0.30, p = .010), suggesting that those who demanded commitment were more inclined to adhere to their nudged assignment. Note that we also explored if persistence and earning depended on demand for commitment, delay discounting and loss aversion in multivariate regressions but found no evidence for associations between for both effort and earnings (all p-values >0.341 see Appendix B). Contrast 3b: The effect of deposit-based incentives in those who chose them Within the nudged assignment arm respondents were free to choose the incentive scheme of their preference, hence the distribution was not equal between the two schemes. 69 out of 113 (61%) respondents chose rewardbased incentives while 44 (39%) chose the deposit-based incentive scheme. Since this assignment was not random, any possible difference between the two groups reflects a combination of effects of the incentive scheme and selection 4 It appears that between sessions drop-out was not associated with taking up the advice for deposit-based incentives. That is, the proportion of respondents following up on deposit advice in session T0 and returning for session T1 was approximately the same: in T0 this applied to 44 out of 100 respondents (44%) and of the 72 respondents returning for T1 n=31 adhered to deposit advice (39%), see also Figure 1. The differences between baseline and repeated measurements observed for would have led to a different advice in 17 out of 81 respondents that showed up for the second session in that condition. Of those whose advice would have changed when repeated measurements were used, the far majority would have received the advice to take reward-based incentives instead of deposit-based incentives (16 out of 17).
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